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might even go further and argue that 
it is in fact right to lie in order to gen-
erate the best result for the greatest 
number of people. In the reverse situ-
ation, where a group bonus is divided 
proportionally based on individual 
performance, one manager might lie 
in order to increase his/her own stake 
at the expense of others. This might be 
labelled anti-social lying.
Reporting profits can at times ap-
pear to be as much an art as a science. 
The existence of a range of variables 
such as product and maintenance 
costs that can be changed almost 
arbitrarily creates opportunities and 
temptations to be economical with the 
truth. Ambiguity in accounting stand-
ards can further complicate the issue, 
presenting opportunities for non- 
fraudulent dishonesty.
Spending less on the maintenance 
of plant and machinery, for example, 
will boost short-term profits at the ex-
pense of longer-term issues. But by the 
time those issues force themselves to 
the top of the agenda, the managers 
involved will likely have moved else-
where (and might well have repeated 
the trick elsewhere, boosting their own 
managerial reputation without deliver-
ing true added value). 
Our experiment confirms that a 
considerable proportion of participants 
will report dishonestly to increase their 
payoff, although not to the maximum 
possible extent (they might be dishon-
est but they are not all greedy). The 
problem to solve, then, is to reduce 
the propensity to lie and therefore to 
reduce the number of liars and the vol-
ume of lies they tell.
Honesty in the presentation of finan-
cial performance figures by bonus-
driven executives presents a continu-
ing challenge to modern business. 
The bad news is that its requirements 
can easily be sidestepped by unscru-
pulous individuals or groups of indi-
viduals determined to maximise their 
own financial return at the expense 
of colleagues. 
The good news is that there exist 
effective potential remedies for the 
condition. This has clear implications 
for all stakeholders in any commer-
cial operation. Greater transparency 
can deliver positive results, as dem-
onstrated in the paper How Control 
System Design Influences Performance 
Misreporting that I co-wrote with Victor 
S. Maas and which was published in the 
Journal of Accounting Research. 
The inspiration for the paper was 
the belief that managers who benefit 
from an information advantage will 
tend to exaggerate the results they 
have achieved in order to be awarded 
larger bonuses than would otherwise 
be the case. The recent news that UK 
supermarket chain Tesco had overstat-
ed profits by £250m provides a timely 
example of managers exaggerating 
results (see box). 
Those who know and understand 
the underlying numbers better than 
anyone else in the organisation are 
well placed to overstate income or un-
derstate costs for their own short-term 
financial benefit. Putting it simply and 
bluntly, people have a tendency to lie 
in their own self-interest; a recurring 
theme throughout our experiment and 
the subsequent ongoing analysis.
Different questions arise with dif-
ferent forms of bonus payment. In the 
case of group bonus systems, for ex-
ample, the incentive exists for a broad-
er number of people to lie in order to 
boost evenly distributed group bonus 
payments. Even a partly trained moral 
philosopher could probably argue that 
this particular tendency towards what 
some might label as social lying is 
acceptable; a full-blooded utilitarian 
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New research into the honesty of business unit managers when re-
porting performance shows that they have a tendency to overstate 
results when financial rewards are at stake. 
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 A case in point
The Financial Times (FT) highlighted how the timing of 
recognition of commercial income can affect published 
figures.
“Typically the central finance department will send emails 
to individual Tesco managers, asking them what rebates 
they expect to receive from their suppliers in relation to 
first-half trading,” the FT explains. “This is a judgment 
made by the managers, who will not necessarily have 
to provide evidence for their assessment. This means 
there could be a temptation to be overly optimistic when 
estimating the rebates.”
Source: Financial Times, 22-09-2014, “Q&A: What went 
wrong at Tesco”, by C. Barrett, H. Agnew and A. Felsted
Increasing honesty
Organisations seeking to increase hon-
esty in reporting should not only pay 
greater attention to monetary incen-
tives and selection policies in order 
to help them to hire "more ethical" 
managers, but also to the social set-
ting in which performance-reporting 
decisions are made. Organisations 
can use the two control system de-
sign variables from our study, related 
to transparency and group bonus type, 
to influence this setting and the social 
norms that govern the reporting deci-
sions of managers. 
In summary, our results suggest 
that performance misreporting by 
managers is influenced by the design 
of the management control system it-
self. First, overstatements can be seen 
to be lower in a group bonus system 
in which managers reduce the mon-
etary payoff of their peers if they re-
port a higher performance figure. In 
practice, this can be the case when a 
fixed bonus pool amount is distributed 
to managers based on their individual 
relative performance.
In contrast, when a group bonus 
grows with group performance, and 
is distributed evenly among manag-
ers, performance is much more often 
overstated. This dishonesty constitutes 
a "social lie": it helps the individual 
manager, but also the group, by in-
creasing the available group reward. 
This can happen under certain profit 
sharing arrangements.
Second, overstatements are re-
duced if companies adopt an open 
information policy with regard to indi-
vidual performance reports, such that 
everyone knows exactly what everyone 
else has reported. Thus, deciding to be 
transparent in internal reporting sys-
tems seems a viable path for compa-
nies wishing to reduce dishonesty in 
managerial reporting.
The topic lends itself well to future 
study. Further research is needed to 
investigate, for example, how robust 
our results are in settings that differ 
from our own. In general, we believe 
that future accounting research should 
continue to incorporate insights and 
models from behavioural economics. 
As our study shows, design vari-
ables of accounting and control sys-
tems –  which are trivial within the 
traditional agency framework – can 
be very relevant from this broader 
perspective. Therefore, our under-
standing of the antecedents and conse-
quences of such systems in real-world 
organisations is likely to be enhanced 
if researchers start out from a more 
comprehensive model of man than the 
homo economicus. 
This article draws its inspiration from 
the paper How Control System Design 
Influences Performance Misreporting, 
written by Victor S. Maas and Marcel 
van Rinsum and published in the 
Journal of Accounting Research , 
Vol. 51 No. 5, p1159-1186, December 2013. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12025
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A video discussion in which Marcel 
van Rinsum talks about this re-
search can be seen at   WEB  http://bit.
ly/1BrR4W3
 RSM Expertise
The Department of Accounting 
and Control is a compact power-
house of international and influen-
tial faculty members. It has a very 
strong research orientation and an 
equally strong practitioner orienta-
tion. Stakeholders range from aca-
demic researchers to the business 
community of accountants, con-
trollers, and financial advisors. The 
department’s research approach is 
interdisciplinary, integrating both 
economic and behavioural aspects 
of accounting.
 WEB   www.rsm.nl/research/
departments/accounting-control/
